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Impacts of a measles outbreak In western 
sydney on publIc health resources
Kristina L Flego, Daniel A Belshaw, Vicky Sheppeard, Kathryn M Weston
Abstract
During February and March 2011, an outbreak of 
26 confirmed cases of measles was reported to 
the Parramatta Public Health Unit (PHU) in western 
Sydney. This paper describes the impact of the 
outbreak on PHU resources. A retrospective review 
of information obtained from case notification 
forms and associated contact tracing records was 
carried out for each of the confirmed cases. Seven 
cases (27%) required hospital admission for more 
than 1 day and 10 (38%) cases required manage-
ment within a hospital emergency department. 
There were no cases of encephalitis or death. The 
number of contacts was determined for each case 
as well as the number who required post-exposure 
prophylaxis. In total, 1,395 contacts were identified 
in this outbreak. Of these, 79 (5.7%) required nor-
mal human immunoglobulin and 90 (6.5%) were 
recommended to receive the measles-mumps-
rubella vaccine. A case study detailing the PHU 
costs associated with the contact management 
of a hospitalised measles case with 75 identified 
contacts is also included and the estimated total 
cost to the PHU of containing this particular case 
of measles was A$2,433, with staff time compris-
ing the major cost component. Considerable effort 
and resources are required to manage measles 
outbreaks. The total cost of this outbreak to the 
PHU alone is likely to have exceeded A$48,000. 
Commun Dis Intell 2013;37(3):E240–E245.
Keywords: measles, disease outbreaks, 
contact tracing, measles vaccine, health costs, 
immunisation programs
Introduction
Although Australia has declared itself to have 
eliminated measles,1 imported cases continue to 
occur with occasional outbreaks involving local 
transmission amongst under-immunised groups. 
An outbreak of 26 cases of measles occurred within 
1 local government area in western Sydney, New 
South Wales in February and March of 2011.
This paper describes the impact of a measles 
outbreak on public health unit (PHU) resources. 
A case study that estimates the monetary costs to 
the PHU associated with contact management for 
1 measles case is included.
Background
On 4 February 2011, a case of measles in a 12-year-
old girl was reported to the Parramatta PHU. She 
had not travelled recently and no source case was 
identified; however guests from Samoa had stayed 
with her family in the preceding weeks. Eleven 
days later, measles was notified in an 18-month-
old girl, also of Samoan background but without 
recent travel, and with whom the index case had 
occasional social contact although apparently not 
within the estimated infectious period for the index 
case. Two additional cases were notified at this 
time; one was a 20-year-old non-Samoan woman 
with no recent travel history and the other was a 
15-year-old boy of Samoan background. Neither of 
these cases reported any epidemiological connec-
tion to either of the other 2 cases.
During the next 5 weeks a further 22 confirmed 
cases of measles were reported, three of which 
were acquired overseas (Philippines). None of the 
cases had documented evidence of having received 
2 doses of a measles-containing vaccine (MCV). 
Two cases were recorded on the Australian 
Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR) as hav-
ing received 1 dose of the measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccine. In 4 other cases, a parent stated 
that their child had been vaccinated against mea-
sles but this could not be verified.2
Methods
A review of the notification and case-investigation 
records for each confirmed case and their contacts 
was conducted, specifically examining the impact 
on public health resources. According to the NSW 
Health guidelines, a confirmed case of measles 
requires laboratory evidence (measles virus isola-
tion or detection by nucleic acid testing or measles 
IgG seroconversion or measles-virus specific IgM 
antibody detection) or clinical evidence and an 
epidemiological link.3
The Measles Investigation Forms completed for 
each case during the outbreak were reviewed. The 
forms contained information obtained from cases, 
their carers, other associated contacts, and clinicians. 
Details recorded included patient demograph-
ics, symptoms and onset dates, illness outcomes 
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(hospitalisation or death), potential exposures, and 
details of contacts (usually household) and their 
management. Complication and hospitalisation 
rates for cases were calculated using information 
recorded on the Measles Investigation Form.
Contact tracing records were also reviewed. 
Contact tracing and management was performed 
by PHU staff as per the NSW Health guidelines.3 
Whenever a healthcare setting was identified 
as the site of exposure, any person who shared a 
waiting area with a case or was in the waiting or 
consultation room up to 2 hours after the case dur-
ing the infectious period for the case was classified 
as a contact. Names and contact details for staff 
and patients meeting the above definition were 
collected by staff from the healthcare setting and 
provided to the PHU.
Contacts were telephoned and asked about their 
measles vaccination status and any history of mea-
sles infection. Those born after 1965 who were not 
age-appropriately vaccinated against measles and 
who had not previously been infected with mea-
sles virus were offered post-exposure prophylaxis 
(PEP). This was either the MMR vaccine (up to 
72 hours post-exposure) or normal human immu-
noglobulin (NHIG) (4 to 6 days post-exposure or 
for contacts with contraindications to MMR vac-
cine). PEP is not considered effective after 6 days 
(144 hours) post-exposure and so generally is not 
offered after this time4 but efforts were still made to 
inform all contacts about their potential exposure 
regardless of whether prophylaxis was warranted. 
For infants under 6 months of age whose mother’s 
measles immunity status was unclear, a maternal 
measles serum immunoglobulin G (IgG) level 
was urgently requested and results followed-up by 
PHU staff. A positive measles IgG negated the use 
of NHIG in both mother and child.
The total number of contacts for each case 
(including household contacts) and the number 
who required NHIG were recorded. PHU staff 
followed-up each contact to ensure that PEP was 
administered as per the protocol. An estimate of 
the number of contacts for whom MMR was rec-
ommended is provided; but some contacts chose 
the option of double-checking their vaccination 
history before seeking MMR vaccination. In these 
cases, there was no follow-up to confirm receipt of 
the vaccine. Wherever possible, NHIG and MMR 
were provided at the place where contacts were 
exposed to the infectious case (i.e. hospital emer-
gency department or general practice).
Contacts that were unable to be contacted by phone 
were sent a letter informing them of their potential 
exposure to measles, advising on measles signs and 
symptoms and what to do if they suspected they 
were developing the disease.
A case study was conducted to describe the costs of 
following up contacts of 1 particular hospitalised 
case of measles. Data were prospectively gathered 
on the time spent by PHU staff identifying and 
telephoning contacts, arranging testing and PEP, 
and other tasks associated with contact tracing. Staff 
costs were calculated according to their level and it 
was assumed that all staff members were paid at the 
top increment for their award. A log of letters, faxes, 
and phone calls was kept and costed according to 
the standard rate charged by the local health dis-
trict. Pathology costs were actual costs billed by the 
laboratory for tests ordered by the PHU. A follow-up 
telephone call to each contact was made 2 weeks 
later to determine whether any illness had arisen. 
Hospital medical records were reviewed to identify 
any visit to hospital made by contacts who could not 
be reached for follow-up by telephone.
The cost to follow up 1 contact was estimated by 
dividing the costs for following up contacts of this 
case by the number of contacts for the case. The 
total cost of contact follow up to the PHU for the 
outbreak was estimated by multiplying the cost for 
1 contact by the total number of identified contacts 
and adding the staffing cost for a high school vac-
cination clinic that formed part of the outbreak 
response.
As this work was conducted as part of routine 
public health control activities, review by a human 
research ethics committee was not required.
Results
Twenty-six confirmed cases of measles were 
reported to the PHU between 4 February and 
29 March 2011 (Figure). The age of cases ranged 
between 8 months and 35 years and all cases 
resided within a single local government area of 
New South Wales. The mean and median delay 
Figure: Epidemic curve of measles outbreak, 
western Sydney, January to March 2011, by 
onset date and place of acquisition
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between onset of rash and notification was 2 days 
(range 2–8 days) and the mean and median delay 
between onset of illness and notification was 5 days 
(range 1–9 days).
Seven (27%) cases required admission to hospital 
for longer than 1 day. A further 10 (38%) cases were 
managed within a hospital emergency depart-
ment. For all cases, the most common presenting 
symptom in addition to fever, cough, coryza, con-
junctivitis and rash, was diarrhoea (23%). One case 
was diagnosed with pneumonitis. Another case 
experienced recurrent epistaxis requiring nasal 
packing although this was a pre-existing problem 
and was most likely exacerbated by, rather than 
a direct consequence of, measles. There were no 
other serious complications, including no deaths.
In total, 1,395 contacts were identified and managed 
by PHU staff. The average number of contacts per 
case was 54 (median 28). The maximum number 
of contacts for a single case was 206. Most contacts 
resulted from cases visiting large and busy general 
practice clinics, often on multiple occasions. Many 
contacts attended healthcare facilities with one or 
more companions, increasing the total number of 
contacts beyond those included on the initial list 
supplied by the healthcare facility (Table 1).
Table 1: Number of contacts identified during 
the measles outbreak, by exposure category
Household
General 
practice
Emergency 
department Other* Total
161 889 283 62 1,395
* 
Other includes settings such as airplane and social.
Of the identified contacts, 1,241 were contacted 
by telephone and 154 who could not be contacted 
by telephone were sent a letter. Interviews identi-
fied 169 potentially susceptible contacts, of whom 
79 were given NHIG and 90 were recommended 
to receive the MMR vaccine. There were no sec-
ondary cases amongst the contacts given PEP.
Ten cases attended a single high school and had 
onset dates covering a 15-day period. The absence 
of any other epidemiological link between these 
cases suggested that the entire school popula-
tion was at risk. Further, none of these cases had 
documentation of having received a MCV, raising 
concern that under-vaccination was widespread in 
this population. In collaboration with the school, 
a decision was made after notification of the 4th 
case to hold a mass MMR immunisation clinic at 
the school for all staff and students who did not 
have documented evidence of 2 doses of a MCV. 
The clinic was held 7 days later and was run by 
10 nursing staff and 2 medical staff from the PHU. 
Of the total population of 1,150 students and 
100 staff, 492 students (43%) and 42 staff (42%) 
were vaccinated. The major cost of this clinic from 
the PHU perspective was attributed to nursing 
staff salaries (A$2,590) although the total cost of 
vaccine was almost 3 times this figure. However, 
the cost of the vaccine was not met by the PHU 
as it was funded by the NSW Ministry of Health.
A case study conducted for a single case estimated 
that the cost to the PHU of following this case was 
A$2,433 (Box). It can be estimated that the total 
cost to the PHU of contact management for the 
entire outbreak was at least A$48,000.
Box: Case study on Public Health Unit costs 
for responding to a single case of measles
The PHU received a call at 15:15 hours, 8 March 
2011 about a 35-year-old pregnant patient with 
measles serology IgM positive and IgG negative, 
who had been an inpatient on the antenatal ward 
for the past 7 days. Six PHU staff were assigned 
to manage the response to the case. Seventy-five 
patient contacts were identified by the hospital 
for follow-up by PHU staff.
All contacts of the case were notified through: 
telephone (42), letter (25), email (7) and fax (1). 
Five contacts required serology to confirm cur-
rent immunity, 1 contact required MMR vaccine 
and two required urgent NHIG. A total of 49 
hours personnel time over 3 days was spent to 
follow-up the contacts of this single case of mea-
sles. This ranged from 3.5 hours to 17 hours per 
staff member assigned to the case. The average 
time spent per contact was 38 minutes.
Seventy per cent of the 75 contacts (n=52) were 
reached by a follow-up telephone call 2 weeks 
later. The medical records of the remaining 30% 
were reviewed. No secondary cases of measles 
were identified among the contacts.
The costs of all components of the response are 
listed in Table 2. Only costs borne by the PHU are 
included and other costs such as MMR vaccine 
and NHIG which are borne by other parts of the 
health sector (New South Wales Government) 
are excluded. Staff represented 90% of the total 
cost to the PHU of responding to this case. This 
is similar to the estimate derived in Iowa in 2004, 
where once overheads and the costs of the MMR 
vaccine and NHIG were removed, over 90% of 
measles containment costs to the PHU were 
attributed to staff.5
The cost to the PHU for this 1 case of measles 
was A$2,433 with staff representing the major 
cost component of a public health response.
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Table 2:  Public health unit costs for 
responding to a single case of measles
Item Cost (A$2011) % of total
Pathology 158 6.5
Telephone/mobile 59 2.4
Stationery and mail 24 1.0
Staff 2,194 90.1
Total 2,434 100.0
Genotyping of measles viruses was performed 
by the Victorian Infectious Diseases Research 
Laboratory in Melbourne, Australia. The 
D9 genotype (prevalent in South East Asia, Japan 
and Turkey in 20116) was isolated from 7 cases, 
all of whom had definite epidemiological links to 
15 other cases where genotyping was not requested. 
D8 (prevalent in India and the Arabian peninsula 
in 20116) was isolated from 1 case, indicating it 
was an unrelated sporadic case. No source could 
be identified for this case, and no secondary cases 
arose. None of the imported cases (all from The 
Philippines) were able to be genotyped.
Following containment of this outbreak in 
March 2011, no further cases of measles were 
notified in western Sydney until measles was re-
introduced by a returning traveller in April 2012.
Discussion
This outbreak was largely sustained by the clus-
tering of susceptible people within a single high 
school. The lack of evidence of any doses of a 
MCV for most cases underscores the importance 
of MMR vaccine in controlling this disease.
Timeliness of notification, and in some cases, the 
time required to prepare lists of contacts directly 
impacted the type of control measures that could 
be undertaken. Late notifications increased the 
potential need for NHIG and very late notifica-
tions precluded the use of any PEP. The poor spec-
ificity of prodromal signs and symptoms coupled 
with clinician inexperience with measles resulted 
in delayed notification, whilst the moderately 
severe nature of the illness resulted in recurrent 
presentations to healthcare facilities, generating 
more potential contacts.
A significant issue for PHU management was 
poor documentation of vaccination history as well 
as confusion arising from changes to the measles 
vaccination schedule over the past 3 decades. Since 
1996, the ACIR has been used to record the vac-
cination history of all Australian children up to 
their 7th birthday, and this was used to check the 
vaccination history of all contacts up to 15 years of 
age.7 No centralised vaccination recording system 
exists for older individuals, including for vaccines 
administered in school-based measles control pro-
grams. Contacts may have remembered ‘getting 
all their needles at school’ but their immunisation 
documents were not always accessible to PHU 
staff. A reported history of measles infection was 
assumed to be correct. Contacts born before 1966 
were assumed to have experienced natural infec-
tion but still needed to be contacted to determine 
whether they might be immunosuppressed and 
whether they had been accompanied by younger 
(and potentially susceptible) people at the time. 
With the frequent lack of documentation, it is 
possible that some recipients of measles PEP had 
previously received 2 doses of a MCV.
There has been recent discussion in Australia 
about considering the use of childcare and primary 
school entry as a trigger to review vaccination 
status. Such a measure may be helpful in future 
measles contact tracing activities, as children who 
had attended childcare or school in New South 
Wales would be more likely to have up-to-date 
ACIR records.
A 2-dose MMR schedule has been officially rec-
ommended in Australia since 1992.8 In addition, 
between 1992 and 2000 a number of schedule 
changes and catch-up programs targeting school-
aged children and young adults were undertaken. 
These programs complicated the risk assessment 
for contacts who could not provide written vaccina-
tion records. A useful tool for assessing vaccination 
status was a table that listed annual birth cohorts 
from 1966 until 1994 and which drew on historical 
knowledge of vaccination policy to predict whether 
a 2nd dose of a MCV had been offered and in which 
setting. If a contact stated that they received all of 
their school vaccinations and a 2nd dose MMR 
vaccine had been offered to their birth cohort when 
they were in school then receipt of a 2nd dose of a 
MCV was assumed. These strategies of assuming 
2-dose vaccination or a history of disease appeared 
to be justified when evidenced by the lack of sec-
ondary cases reported amongst identified contacts 
that were assessed as not requiring PEP.
On several occasions, pregnant contacts required 
PEP. Measles infection during pregnancy has 
been associated with an increased risk of mater-
nal and foetal complications including pre-term 
delivery and foetal loss.9 Pregnant women who 
have received 2 doses of a MCV in their lifetime 
are considered protected and do not require any 
form of PEP under normal circumstances; how-
ever, for those with uncertain vaccination history 
or known susceptibility to measles, NHIG is indi-
cated as MCVs are contraindicated in pregnancy. 
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Since many women of childbearing age are in the 
age group that is most likely to be susceptible to 
measles in Australia (born after 1965, but prior to 
introduction of the 2-dose schedule), the addition 
of routine antenatal testing for measles immune 
status along with rubella immunity, would be use-
ful. If undertaken prior to pregnancy, vaccination 
could then be provided if required.
One hundred and fifty-four contacts (11%) required 
a letter to inform them of measles exposure. The 
delay in providing these contacts with information 
would have excluded them from the possibility of 
receiving PEP if it was required. Despite this, no 
secondary cases amongst this group were notified 
to the PHU, probably reflecting high levels of 
immunity in the general population.
The case study provides an approximation of the 
monetary costs incurred by the PHU in response 
to a single case of measles. By calculating a ‘cost 
per contact’ and multiplying this figure by the total 
number of contacts, then adding the cost of staffing 
the mass vaccination clinic held at the high school, 
it can be estimated that the total cost of contact 
management for the entire outbreak was in excess 
of A$48,000 (2011 A$) from the PHU perspective 
alone. In reality, the ‘cost per contact’ as calculated 
from this case study probably underestimates the 
true ‘cost per contact’ compared with situations 
where exposure occurred at a general practice or 
hospital emergency department. This is because 
many of the contacts were antenatal patients and 
would have been vaccinated previously or discussed 
vaccination. The hospital was more likely to have 
up-to-date contact details. Contacts may have been 
more co-operative and receptive to advice given 
that they were pregnant and have an ongoing 
relationship with the hospital. This contrasts with 
the more usual situation where contacts of measles 
cases are identified from an emergency department 
or waiting room exposure or, for instance, airplane 
contact. In such situations it can take considerable 
time to obtain lists of contacts, then even more time 
for PHU staff to follow–up. Such contacts may be 
less willing or able to cooperate with public health 
measures than those in this case study, as they 
may not have an established relationship with the 
health service, or they may not have a particular 
focus on possible risks to their health, compared 
with that experienced by pregnant women.
The total cost of containment efforts of an Iowa 
measles outbreak was US$142,452 (2004 US$). 
Excluding costs that were not accounted for in this 
case study (overheads, MMR vaccine and NHIG, 
transport, the costs of the public information cam-
paign and the costs incurred by the Public Health 
Laboratory for Iowa) the figure for Iowa comes to 
US$78 734.5 Contributors to this high cost were 
2 secondary cases and 3 vaccination clinics. Over 
1,000 potential contacts were traced compared 
with almost 1,400 contacts for the western Sydney 
outbreak. Although no direct comparison can be 
made, this calculation does suggest that the figure 
of A$48,000 is an underestimate. The costs did not 
include incident control team meetings, vehicle 
and transport, overtime and time-in-lieu, liaison 
with public health staff in other offices, preparation 
of clinician and media alerts, time liaising with 
infection control, clinical or laboratory staff, nor 
the costs associated with post-outbreak activities 
to finalise the investigations. Moreover, the total 
figure would be much higher if the costs incurred 
by all sectors of the health system including gen-
eral practitioners, maternity unit staff, hospital 
infection control, laboratory staff and emergency 
departments contributing to the identification and 
management of contacts were included.
Enhanced surveillance contributes to the increased 
workload (and cost) created by a measles outbreak. 
During the period 25 February to 16 April 2011, 
16 suspected but subsequently excluded cases of 
measles were reported to the Parramatta PHU. In 
the context of enhanced surveillance, these were 
considered sufficiently suspicious to be extensively 
followed-up. In addition, it is worth noting that 
many other suspected cases were reported to the 
Parramatta PHU (as well as to the Penrith PHU, 
which services the immediately adjacent popula-
tion) but were excluded after initial investigation. 
The time taken to deal with the results of the 
increased awareness and reporting of suspect cases 
adds to the overall costs of the outbreak, particu-
larly as heightened awareness can last for some 
time beyond the final case.
Neither this case study nor the Iowa study inves-
tigated opportunity costs in regards to resources 
utilised in responding to an infectious disease 
outbreak. Clinical staff administering PEP were 
removed from attending to other patients and 
PHU infectious diseases staff were occupied with 
measles cases and contact management with little 
time to work on other tasks or projects.
Conclusions
Costs associated with public health interventions 
should be assessed to ensure value for money, 
appropriate resource allocation and value for the 
community. Measles is a re-emerging disease of 
public health significance in Australia and consid-
erable time and resources are invested in striving to 
control an outbreak. Maintaining Australia’s mea-
sles elimination status requires extensive effort in 
outbreak control to reduce the number of second-
ary cases, their consequent morbidity and health 
care costs. However, of much more importance is 
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a robust measles vaccination strategy that achieves 
high level coverage, thus preventing outbreaks in 
the event of an imported case. Recent initiatives to 
improve 2-dose measles vaccine coverage, includ-
ing amendments to the Public Health Act 2010 in 
New South Wales to require the presentation of 
immunisation documentation for entry into child-
care and bringing forward the 2nd MMR dose 
to 18 months of age should improve population 
immunity for measles and reduce the risk of future 
outbreaks.
The PHU was unable to immediately contact 
more than 10 per cent of the notified contacts, but 
through examining records of hospital admission 
and attendance it was determined that there were 
no secondary cases amongst these contacts during 
the period in which PEP would have been effec-
tive, suggesting that current population immunity 
is high enough to prevent sustained transmission. 
One benefit of the outbreak has been collaboration 
between members of the local Pacific Islander 
community and the PHU to provide catch-up vac-
cination and community education about immu-
nisation in Australia.
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